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ABSTRACT
The relation between technology assessment (TA) and responsible
research and innovation (RRI) is a very topical (and controversial)
issue, as TA is clearly enveloped inAQ2
¶
broader science, technology
and innovation (STI) processes, such as the EU-wide shift towards
RRI. In this short response to van Lente et alAQ3
¶
.’s essay, I first stress
that this contribution has several merits; for example, it points to
pervasive challenges for TA communities, such as the issue of
including normative concerns when assessing innovations, it
opens these challenges to debate, without shying away from
engaging TA communities. However, I disagree with the authors’
claim that RRI would be ‘a next step of TA’ or even a ‘form of TA’.
In my essay, I explain why I believe RRI is different from TA and
why, rather than a critique of TA, RRI could instead lead to a
travesty of TA, threatening the vitality and the uniqueness of TA
institutions in the long-term. Under the spell of RRI, TA risks being
reduced to a role of mere provider of ex-ante impact assessments.
I conclude that following the money attached to RRI has a price
that TA institutions should carefully, critically and reflexively
consider before they pay.
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innovation; politics of TA
In the early nineteenth century, the English author Mary Shelley published a novel entitled
‘Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus’ that tells the story of Victor Frankenstein, a
young scientist who creates a grotesque but intelligent monster in a scientific experiment.
Two centuries later, both the nature and the space of experiments have changed drasti-
cally. While experiments are still generally thought of as actions or operations undertaken
to test a scientific hypothesis in settings detached from the rest of society (e.g. in scientific
laboratories), I suggest situating responsible research and innovation (RRI) in a more
macro-sociological understanding of ‘experiment’, one that implies a process of societal
self-experimentation (Gross and Krohn 2005), and with social scientists and technology
assessment (TA) practitioners partaking in the experiment as observing participants.1
RRI’s origins are often attributed to René Von Schomberg,2 a Dutch philosopher with a
background in science and technology studies (STS) and TA. Rather than in a scientific
lab, it is from within the European Commission that Von Schomberg imagined the
world of RRI (2011a, 2011b). Like a modern Victor Frankenstein, the inventor now has
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from the corridors of the European Commission to the venue of academic conferences, to
articles published in academic journals like the highly acclaimed academic Journal of
Responsible Innovation (JRI). Interestingly, both as a concept and as an approach, even
though it has now become an overarching key feature of the EU Horizon 2020 Pro-
gramme, RRI is still characterized by uncertainty and open-endedness. It is still ‘very
AQ4
¶
much a policy innovation project in the making, its boundaries are not yet determined
or fixed; rather, they are continuously expanded and redrawn’ (Van Oudheusden 2014,
2). It is also a label ‘that may intuitively feel right, but which exhibits a lack of clarity in
terms of definition, practice and, at a policy level, motivation’ (Owen, Macnaghten, and
Stilgoe 2012, 752).
In spite of its indistinctness, RRI’s ‘impressive’ ‘career through the realms of national
and European policy’ (Van Lente, Swierstra, and Joly 2017) and in academia deserves
due attention, especially when it meets older traditions, philosophies and practices pur-
portedly in line with its rationale. It is at the occasion of one of RRI’s encounters with
TA that I am given the opportunity of writing this short response to Harro van Lente,
Tsjalling Swiestra and Pierre-Benoît Joly’s essay on ‘Responsible Innovation as a critique
of Technology Assessment’. Before I go any further, I believe it is relevant to mention that I
was present at the second PACITA3 conference in Berlin (25–27 February 2015), where
this paper was first presented and generated animated debates among panelists and
other participants. During their talk, van Lente et al. quoted the PACITA manifesto
(first publicly presented at the same conference), arguing that the TA community was dip-
lomatically recalling its prominence and policy relevance as the ‘self-appointed mother of
RRI’:
Responsible Research and Innovation has shaped the last year’s policy discourse in Europe
related to the societal role of research and innovation. It has given key concepts in TA,
such as participation, forward-thinking, reflexivity and policy action, greater focus. TA can
and should be a key carrier of the concept and play a light-house role in RRI. (PACITA
manifesto)
In the discussion following the talk, both René Von Schomberg and several TA prac-
titioners expressed their concerns that the authors had not properly understood the pre-
mises of either RRI or TA approaches, and they contested the idea of taking RRI as a
critique of TA. As in numerous previous other occasions, Von Schomberg recited his
renowned, and widely circulated, deﬁnition of RRI, almost as if it were sufﬁcient to
show the merits and imperious necessity of the approach:
Responsible Research and Innovation is a transparent, interactive process by which societal
actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical)
acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its market-
able products (in order to allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological advances
in our society). (Von Schomberg 2011a, 9)
He stressed that TA was at the heart of the RRI approach, alongside technology foresight
and impact assessment, and that the institutionalization of these prospective tools could
‘help to identify societal desirable products by addressing the normative anchor points
throughout their development’ (see Von Schomberg 2011a, 10). In turn, TA practitioners











anteriority of TA approaches and practices, stressing that TA will continue to play a role in
the development of RRI.
In other words, the relation between TA and RRI is a very topical (and controversial)
issue, as TA is clearly enveloped in broader science, technology and innovation (STI) pro-
cesses, such as the EU-wide shift towards RRI (Delvenne et al. 2015, 26). It is thus impor-
tant that critical debates take place in academic settings (e.g. journals like JRI), in order to
further progress the understanding and operationalization of both approaches and related
practices. The essay of van Lente et al. has several merits; for example, it points to pervasive
challenges for TA communities, such as the issue of including normative concerns when
assessing innovations, it opens these challenges to debate, without shying away from enga-
ging TA communities. However, the essay is less lively than the debate at the PACITA
conference and, in my view, it fails to acknowledge the variety and richness of institutional
TA models, methodologies and approaches that coexist today. To support their brief
description of what TA is about, they narrowly focus on the US Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA), which closed its doors more than twenty years ago and has never
had an equivalent in Europe. In spite of numerous exchanges between OTA staffers
and European delegations in the early days of European Parliamentary TA, it was never
possible to duplicate the American OTA elsewhere. This was due to the presence of rela-
tively weaker Parliaments in Europe, benefiting from limited in-house capacities and
slimmer budgets than their American counterpart (Delvenne 2011, 26). While it is true
that TA was originally developed within the context of US policy-making in the 1970s,
TA practices quickly gained impetus in Europe, somewhat independently from what
was happening in the US, notably through the erection of parliamentary TA (PTA)
agencies on the EU level and on the national and regional levels of policy-making (Vig
and Paschen 2000; Joss and Bellucci 2002; Delvenne 2011; Ganzevles, van Est, and Nent-
wich 2014).
Since then, governmental and nongovernmental entities, such as universities and think
tanks, have also adopted the TA label, resulting in a variety of TA practices, including con-
structive TA (Rip, Misa, and Schot 1995; Schot and Rip 1997; see also Rip and van Lente
2013 on more recent CTA developments), interactive TA (Grin, Van de Graaf, and Hoppe
1997), real-time TA (Guston and Sarewitz 2002), policy-oriented TA (Klüver et al. 2016)
and programs that bear a strong resemblance to TA, such as upstream public engagement
in science and technology (Wilsdon, Stilgoe, and Wynne 2005) and, later on, RRI.
Whereas the authors rightly point at the fact that the initial aim of TA was to reduce
the costs of technologies’ detrimental effects by anticipating potential impacts of technol-
ogy and providing policymakers with ostensibly neutral scientific advice, TA subsequently
became a process of ongoing dialogue that supports actors’ decision-making processes and
the formation of opinions on science–society issues. Generally speaking, the coexistence of
various models and approaches from the outset, rather than the succession of TA gener-
ations (as argued by van Lente et al. but also by some members of the TA community, e.g.
Van Eijndhoven 1997), has always reflected the need for TA institutions to fit with their
national civic epistemologies (Jasanoff 2004), that is, ‘styles of reasoning, modes of argu-
mentation, standards of evidence, and norms of expertise that characterize public delibera-
tion and political institutions’ (Miller 2008, 1896). Thus, rather than having ‘old TA’ being
overcome by the advent of ‘new TA’ or ‘Constructive TA’, different ways of doing TA
developed concurrently. Even though not every PTA embraced the participatory turn in










the exact same way, all PTA institutions were to some extent participatory, in the sense of
including experts, stakeholders or citizens in the TA process (Joss 2000; Vig and Paschen
2000; Joss and Bellucci 2002; Delvenne 2011). Van Lente, Swierstra, and Joly (2017) also
consider that Denmark and the Netherlands have been at the forefront of public partici-
pation in TA settings, which is true, but it is only a part of the story. They forget to
mention that in these two countries as in many others across Europe, including but not
limited to Switzerland, Norway, Belgium or Austria, numerous participatory methods rel-
evant to emerging issues to be tackled were invented and deployed either at the regional,
national, European or even global levels.4 Like many academics, although I admit this is
also often heard in the TA world, the authors continue to refer to the famous consensus
conference, first adapted by the Danes in the 1980s, as if it still were the hallmark of par-
ticipatory TA. Doing so, they seem to ignore that, for fifteen years or so, even the Danes
have stopped organizing costly consensus conferences. Instead, they usually give their pre-
ference to more affordable or simply different (combinations of) methods to reach out to
the experts, stakeholders and citizens.
Furthermore, while it may be heuristically helpful to present TA rationales as if they
were mutually exclusive, for instance expert and participatory TA, in real-life settings it
is extremely common to have experts, stakeholders and citizens consulted in one single
project. In other words, even though I understand that their history of TA had to be
brief, the authors provide us with an oversimplified and somehow misleading account
of what TA actually is and has been about. Lastly, as regards the possible ‘perversity’ of
what they label ‘new TA’, namely the risk of identifying with the particular interests of
the stakeholders, I wonder why it wouldn’t be a risk when consulting experts too (the
so-called attribute of ‘old TA’). Indeed, experts’ particular interests, values, norms and
worldviews are enmeshed with the social construction of science and technologies. Van
Lente et al. emphasize the risk that identifying with particular interests would turn ‘TA
into politics by other means’. Keeping on with the provocative and constructive tone of
my interlocutors, I claim the benefits of a certain perversity and, to paraphrase Winner
(1980), I argue that TA has politics, and that this is a potentially good thing not to be
ashamed or afraid of. Indeed, as we explain elsewhere (see Delvenne et al. 2015; Van Oud-
heusden et al. 2015) TA is typically associated with a political preference for more parti-
cipatory or deliberative modes of decision-making, supporting the ideas of publics’
‘empowerment’, ‘policy enlightenment’, ‘healthier aging’ or ‘sustainable development’.
These preferences are not neutral. They have been reproduced in a great number of Euro-
pean countries where left-wing political parties play, or played, a key role in institutiona-
lizing TA (Delvenne 2011). As Van Oudheusden (2014) notes, TA’s political affiliations
are often denied or downplayed across TA communities. TA is typically framed as an ana-
lytic activity aimed at providing decision-makers with an objective analysis of a technology
(Van Eijndhoven 1997) and/or as an interactive and communicative tool that aims to
enrich the basis for public debate and STI decision-making (Decker and Ladikas 2004,
see also the EPTA website). These broad designations (i.e. geared towards all political fac-
tions and to the benefit of all innovation actors) risk trivializing and undermining the very
policy changes TA advocates seek to instigate when TA is associated with specific political
parties or politicians (Delvenne et al. 2015, 26). The claim of neutrality as a ‘legitimatory
myth’ for TA has undoubtedly been helpful to anchor the approach in evidence-based











and Denmark may lead the TA communities to reassess the myth’s usefulness and rel-
evance. Reflecting on the closure of the Danish Board of Technology as a government-
funded institution, Horst (2014) quoted famous lyrics by Cohen (1992):
Ring the bells that still can ring
Forget your perfect offering
There is a crack, a crack in everything
That’s how the light gets in.
Today, TA communities themselves are looking through the cracks of parliamentary TA
as-we-know-it and are beginning to wonder if it is still bearable and productive for TA to
‘restrict itself to the role of a “knowledge broker” and refraining from taking a strong pol-
itical stance in terms of recommending speciﬁc political action’ (Hennen and Nierling
2017). My personal opinion is that TA should give up the chimera of neutrality and
run the risk of facing the implications of taking sides in order to advance critical ideas
and to deepen societal debates from the privileged position it enjoys at the intersection
of STI, politics and society. Assuming its politics, ‘partisan’ TA should not be taken as pol-
itical parties’ research units, but it would for sure have immediate political relevance. If TA
is not or cannot be a ‘neutral’ governance or policy advice tool, then it has to assume the
inherent normativities well-entrenched in its DNA. This is where I can share the authors’
critique that TA may not (enough) address its own normativities. Still, both conceptually
and through its modes of operation (e.g. methods and concepts, publications, policy inter-
ventions), TA is intrinsically normative as it purports a different socio-technical order to
be; indeed, as TA practitioners purport a more inclusive and equitable science–society
relationship than is presently the case and act on their commitments to improve technol-
ogy in society, they engage with ethics in a broad sense (Lucivero, van Ouheusden, and
Delvenne forthcomingAQ5
¶
). However, the normative-ethical agenda of TA is rarely rendered
explicit and actively reﬂected on within TA communities. Armin Grunwald, the Director
of the German PTA, diagnosed the normative deﬁcit of TA as early as 1999 but it seems
that a substantial part of that diagnosis is still valid today. As a consequence, TA prac-
titioners overlook a whole range of questions that have methodological, practical and pol-
itical implications for TA and the broader context in which TA plays out. However, I
disagree with that being the background for the authors’ claim that RRI would be ‘a
next step of TA’ or even a ‘form of TA’. In the remainder of this short response, I will
explain why I believe RRI is different from TA and why, rather than a critique of TA,
RRI could instead lead to a travesty of TA, threatening the vitality and the uniqueness
of TA institutions in the long-term.
RRI is the blunt expression of an oxymoron. As such, innovation cannot be responsible
due to the inherently uncertain and disruptive process of creative destruction that charac-
terizes innovation (Schumpeter 1942). Therefore, RRI reflects the need to reconcile a
tension between the unconditional support of STI as strategic resources to generate
growth and competitiveness and the acknowledgment that it is far from automatic that
STI will meet the needs and concerns of citizens or contribute to an increase of their
well-being. Two perspectives can be derived from this observation (Thoreau 2013) and
related to TA practices. The first perspective revolves around the idea that RRI would










be a response to what the German sociologist Beck (1992) calls ‘organized irresponsibility’,
which designates the systemic denial of risks within modern cultural and industrial struc-
tures. Beck uses these terms to point at a contradiction between an emerging public aware-
ness of technological risks produced by and within the social-institutional system on the
one hand, and the lack of attribution of systemic risks to this system on the other (Mythen
2007). According to him, the advent of a ‘risk society’ is characterized by a shift in the
power play between the production and distribution of ‘social goods’ (healthcare, employ-
ment, sustainability and wealth) and the production and distribution of ‘social bads’
(environmental pollution and contaminated food-stuffs). Progressively, and largely
unconsciously, welfare state societies have drifted away their central focus on the positive
acquisition of ‘goods’ towards a negative logic bound up with the avoidance of ‘bads’
(Mythen 2007, 798). To counterbalance the side effects of industrial and technological
progress, following Hennen (1999), I have argued elsewhere (Delvenne 2011; Delvenne,
Fallon, and Brunet 2011) that TA emerged as a practicable institutional response to
real-world challenges that are hard to control, such as socio-technical uncertainties, con-
troversies and public ambivalence about technology developments. These developments
played out in the context of ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck 1992; Beck, Giddens, and
Lash 1994; Beck and Grande 2010) in which modern societies and institutions are
thrown back on themselves. From that perspective, the addition of the wor(l)d ‘respon-
sible’ next to ‘innovation’ reasserts the possibility of modulating the co-evolution of
science and technology in society (Fisher, Mahajan, and Mitcham 2006; Rip 2006) and
sustains the modernist fiction that the side effects of industrial modernity can be kept
under control. Nevertheless, one can still argue that this is exactly what TA has been
doing for the last five decades, so why would we need a new concept, if it turns out to
be just old wine in new bottles?
This leads me to stress a second perspective from which to look at RRI as an oxymoron.
It sheds light on the blatant absurdity of a figure of speech, which, to me resembles a diver-
sionary tactic (Méheust 2009; Gutwirth and Christiaens 2015) for absorbing, rather than
reconciling, an irreducible tension – how to justify unconditional support of STI while
assuming the side effects of its developments – without putting it into politics, which is pre-
cisely the central aim of TA. Under that perspective, RRI results in an approach avoiding
any true disturbance of the development of new innovations (Thoreau 2013). As van Oud-
heusden has convincingly argued, there is not much room for politics in RRI. The
approach ‘largely ignores questionsAQ6
¶
about the politics in deliberation (e.g. how actors
craft RRI through strategic use of argument and other advantage-seeking techniques),
as well as the politics of deliberation (e.g. how RRI privileges a process definition of
democracy at the cost of participatory and representative perspectives). He adds that
proponents of RRI typically present RRI along procedural lines rather than political onesAQ7
¶
;
that is, they emphasize the importance of talk, deliberative argumentation, and due pro-
cedure without attending to questions of power, ends, and authority that play out in, and
through, RRI processes. (Thoreau 2013, 3)
For Van Oudheusden (2014), the neglect or rejection of politics, understood as the con-
stitution and contestation of power, is a common feature of both RRI and TA.
A crucial difference between TA and RRI, however, is that RRI posits innovation as a











underlying logic is that it would be immoral to oppose or contest the development of inno-
vations, especially when it is expected from them to fix a set of epochal crises and grand
challenges (Tyfield 2012). To make sense of what makes that rationale ‘responsible’ to the
tenants of the approach, it is heuristically illuminating to confront what they take as good
in itself to what they implicitly consider as bad in itself (Goulet 2016), namely strong
public dissent or resistance to the adoption or the development of new technologies.
From a historical perspective, it is no surprise if at the EU level the development of RRI
went hand in hand with the development of nanotechnologies (Thoreau 2013). At stake
was the felt need to ‘get it right from the very beginning’ (Roco and Bainbridge 2005),
in order to avoid the failure of the GMO moratorium and to eschew ‘irrational’ struggles
resulting from misunderstandings and leading to impracticable policy decisions (Grun-
wald 2014).
Therefore, for innovation to be governable, RRI distributes responsibility to supposedly
rational and autonomous individuals. By promoting the adoption of soft governance tools,
like codes of conduct, RRI develops into a new form of governmentality (Thoreau 2013;
Van Oudheusden 2014); that is, a strategy to intervene in science and technology to ration-
alize actions and control actors from a distance (Rose 1999; Foucault 2008 [1978]). RRI
therefore reproduces the constant denial of the system of ‘organized irresponsibility’,
which
manifests itself in […] technically orientated legal procedures designed to satisfy rigorous
causal proof of individual liability and guilt. This self-created dead end, in which culpability
is passed off on to individuals and thus collectively denied, is maintained through political
ideologies of industrial fatalism: faith in progress, dependence on rationality and the rule
of expert opinion. (Elliott 2002, 297–298)
In other words, as RRI elevates innovation as a ‘social good’, at the same time, it diverts
public and political attention from the ‘social bads’ induced by innovation. To ensure
the rightful distribution of responsibility, RRI promotes the ‘co-responsibility’ of industrial
and societal actors, implying both a transfer of responsibility at the level of individuals and
a collective appeal to responsibility supported by public debate. However, by considering
that ‘upon everyone’s shoulders rests a particular moral obligation to engage in the collec-
tive debate that shapes the context for collective decision making’ (Von Schomberg 2007;
Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012, 756), RRI’s rationale moralizes publics, trivializes
those who would not want to ‘take their part’ of responsibility, and ignores the more vul-
nerable individuals who lack the economic, political and cultural resources to engage in
collective debate.
Under the spell of RRI, TA risks being reduced to a role of mere provider of ex-ante
impact assessments. Von Schomberg (2011b) does not make any mystery of the future
he envisions for TA:
In the context of European policy making, Technology Assessments (TA), ideally, have to
merge with other types of impact assessments, as the success of major public policies increas-
ingly depend on the anticipated impacts or the selected scientific and technological options.
In that ostensibly ideal future, ‘the quest for positive or right impacts’ eludes highly pol-
itical questions (such as, for instance, whose right impacts? Positive for whom? Serving
what interests? Towards what goals?), and forces TA institutions to shift their practices










to ﬁt with what RRI tenants take as emerging features of public policy. Such a shift may
undermine the added value of TA knowledge, compared to foresight or other strategic
intelligence bodies called upon to foresee and legitimate the possible outcomes of
planned innovation activities.
This time is critical for TA institutions, struggling for survival in an epoch of scarce
public resources. Following the money attached to RRI has a price that TA institutions
should carefully, critically and reflexively consider before they pay. Just like the monster
created by Frankenstein, RRI is here to stay and is taking a life of its own:5 TA pro-
fessionals, practitioners and communities will have to experiment, not only in labs but
also in the real-world of politics, with how they can and ought to cope with it.
Notes
1. For the sake of clarity, I want to mention that I am working in the field of science and tech-
nology studies (STS), with an active participation in several STS associations. At the same
time, I have been engaged in technology assessment activities in the last 10 years (as part
of PhD, postdoctoral or collaborative research at the EU level, e.g. in the PACITA
project). I thus also consider myself a TA practitioner and member of the TA community
at large. Lastly, the research centre I am co-directing is an Associate Member of the European
Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA) network.
2. The terms ‘responsible innovation’ or ‘responsible research and innovation’ have a history
stretching back 15 years or so and multiple roots in the United States and Europe (Owen,
Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012, 751; Van Oudheusden 2014). However, it is in Europe, and
especially at the European Commission policy level, that the terms gained the more visibility
and traction (Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012). For this reason, and also because the
Parliamentary Technology Assessment offices and networks are mostly located in Europe,
this essay will take Europe as its primary focus.
3. PACITA was a four-year (2011–2015) EU-financed project under 7th Framework Pro-
gramme aimed at increasing the capacity and enhancing the institutional foundation for
knowledge-based policy-making on issues involving science, technology and innovation,
mainly based upon the diversity of practices in Parliamentary Technology Assessment
(PTA). See www.pacitaproject.eu.
4. Examples include the CIVISTI method, combining future-oriented discussions of national
citizens panels and stakeholder and expert participation (www.civisti.org), or the World
Wide Views method, which has been used at the European and global levels to organize citi-
zens consultations on policy issues (www.wwviews.org).
5. While others are less certain as to whether RRI will indeed evolve at the policy level into a
distinct let alone a lasting form (e.g. Rip 2016), such a state of affairs does not lessen in
my mind potential concerns that RRI may nevertheless exert an undue influence on TA
funding, TA practices, or both.
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